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ABSTRACT
A survey (N¼ 120) examined variables that contribute to the willingness of people to engage in silent
marches against violence in the Netherlands. As argued in Sacred Value Protection Model (SVPM) of
Tetlock, Kristel, Elson, Green, and Lerner (2000) and moral mandate theory of Skitka, Bauman, and
Sargis (2005), moral threats that are triggered by violent incidents, may indeed drive people to protest
against such incidents. Our ﬁndings indicated dual pathways to such protests, that are all associated
with reactive, angry empathic concerns. These concerns involve people’s outrageous, punitive
reactions towards offenders on behalf of the victims. These concerns are directly or indirectly
related to people’s participation intentions. That is, they directly inﬂuence the participation intention
variable, or indirectly, through (re-)establishing the belief in a just-world, or through more fearful,
self-directed moral cleansing reactions. These latter reactions aim at reinforcing community-shared
moral standards. Copyright # 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Key words: afﬁliation; identiﬁcation; just-world beliefs; moral responses; sacred values; senseless
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INTRODUCTION
In the last decade, a new phenomenon has arisen in Dutch society: the participation of
residents in so-called ‘Silent Marches’ against violence. These marches are often held in
remembrance of innocent victims, who found their death through the use of ‘senseless’
violence. Such marches do not restrict themselves to the Netherlands. For instance, on
23 April 2006, an estimated 80 000 citizens gathered in Brussels (Belgium) to massively
demonstrate against the murder of a 17-year-old boy, who was stabbed to death for an
mp3-player at Brussels’ Central Station.
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No study has hitherto been conducted to examine people’s reasons for engaging in such
demonstrations. The current study aims to partially ﬁll this gap. Our research was guided
by the Sacred Value Protection Model (SVPM, e.g. Tetlock, 2003; Tetlock, Kristel, Elson,
Green, & Lerner, 2000), moral mandate theory (Skitka, Bauman, & Sargis, 2005) and by
the research of Lodewijkx and co-workers on ‘senseless’ violence (Lodewijkx,
DeKwaadsteniet, & Nijstad, 2005; Lodewijkx, DeKwaadsteniet, van Zomeren, &
Petterson, 2005; Lodewijkx, Wildschut, Nijstad, Savenije, & Smit, 2001; van Zomeren
& Lodewijkx, 2005). These latter studies examined the role of just-world and different
identiﬁcation processes and offender-related punitive reactions in response to violent
incidents.
Protection of sacred values
According to Tetlock et al.’s (2000) SVPM, people often act to protect sacred values from
being attacked. A sacred value can be deﬁned ‘as any value that a moral community
implicitly or explicitly treats as possessing inﬁnite or transcendental signiﬁcance that
precludes comparisons, trade-offs, or indeed any other mingling with bounded or secular
values’ (ibid., p. 853). Examples of such sacred-secular value trade-offs are the buying and
selling of human body parts for medical transplant operations; surrogate motherhood
contracts; selling babies for adoption purposes; or killing someone without provocation or
for money (or, we add, for anmp3-player, as happened in Brussels). The SVPM argues that,
whenever individuals perceive trade-offs between sacred values and utilitarian, economic
or other functionalist (secular) motives, they tend to adopt a ‘moralist-theologian
metaphor’ rather than a ‘functionalist metaphor’ as a way to cope with such situations
(ibid., p. 853). This replacement propels people ‘to protect their private selves and public
identities from moral contamination by impure thoughts and deeds’ (ibid.). This protection
is achieved by means of two motivated responses: Moral outrage and moral cleansing.
Moral outrage is a response associated with a desire to denigrate the offender of the sacred
value and with strengthening the moral boundaries to future threats. It also involves the
expression of the limits of what is morally and socially acceptable to people, and what is
not. Moral cleansing involves value afﬁrmation, that is (re-)afﬁrming one’s commitment to
the sacred value and one’s solidarity with the moral community. Moral outrage is more
strongly related to anger and may involve, among others, punitive reactions directed at
offenders (Tetlock, 2003; Tetlock et al.). We included such punitive reactions in our study
and they will be outlined in later sections. Value afﬁrming, moral cleansing responses are
more strongly associated with fear (Skitka, Baumann, &Mullen, 2004) and this response is
more self-directed compared to the moral outrage reaction.
Moral mandates and silent marches
According to the SVPM and moral mandate theory, moral convictions provide an exclusive
motivation for communal protest, because they are experienced as non-negotiable,
unwavering and absolute ‘sacred truths’ (Skitka et al., 2005). The theories contend that
people are strongly motivated to defend their moral convictions against any persons or
situations that go against their moral convictions, such as, we argue, incidents involving
‘senseless’ violence. According to moral mandate theory, the strength of moral convictions
to drive collective protest is different from the more classic explanations of this
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phenomenon. Van Zomeren (2006) summarizes these explanations. They may refer to
perceptions of instrumentality such as the group’s efﬁcacy to bring about social change, as
proposed in resource mobilization theory. They may relate to perceptions of collective
injustice, as put forward in relative deprivation theory. They may further relate to group
actions directed to establish, maintain or enhance a positive social identity, as argued by
social identity theory. According to Skitka et al., the model of coping with moral threat
constitutes a new avenue to study collective protest. On these grounds, we expect that—in
the face of violent incidents that evokemoral threat—moral-punitive beliefs will constitute
an important underlying dimension in people’s decisions to engage in silent marches
against violence. Besides these morality-based processes, additional variables may also
contribute to people’s participation intentions. We derived these variables from the
senseless violence studies conducted by Lodewijkx and co-workers.
Just-world beliefs
Tetlock (2003) contends that people’s absolute and inviolable commitment to justice
constitutes another sacred value. Whenever people perceive transgressions of this value
their reactions will become ‘outrageous’ (ibid., p. 320). Such reactions may be triggered
when people feel that the violence committed upon an innocent victim is perceived to be
utterly unjust. Just-world theory (e.g. Hafer & Be`gue, 2005) assumes that the threatening
notion of living in an unpredictable and unmanageable unjust world will drive people to
defensively preserve the delusion that the world is a just place. In such a just world people
deserve what they get, and, hence, get what they deserve. Applying this ‘deservingness’
strategy gives people a safe and secure feeling. It appears to have health-buffering
functions, and, in that sense, may even be regarded as a coping strategy (e.g. Otto, Boos,
Dalbert, Scho¨ps, & Hoyer, 2006). The preservation of the belief in a just world can be
established by applying either cognitive or behavioural strategies, or both. These strategies
are all used to restore justice (Hafer & Be`gue). Through the use of cognitive, victim-
deservingness strategies (the blaming and/or derogating of innocent victims) people may
attempt to deny or invalidate the injustice, brought upon the victim. The more rational,
behavioural strategies refer to wishes for stronger penalties for violent offenders, attempts
to help the victims, or attempts to ﬁnd compensation or redress for these persons, their
spouses and relatives. Experimental studies conducted by Hafer (2000) and Lodewijkx,
DeKwaadsteniet, and van Zomeren et al. (2005), indeed, found evidence that people’s
just-world beliefs are activated, when being exposed to innocent victims of violence, who
did not ﬁnd just deserts. Accordingly, it can be expected that just-world beliefs may be
involved in people’s intentions to participate in silent marches, presumably in an effort to
preserve or re-establish the belief that the world is a just place.
Punitive reactions
Regarding the punitive tendencies, Rucker, Polifroni, Tetlock, and Scott (2004; see also
Carlsmith, Darley, & Robinson, 2005) distinguish two types of punitiveness: deterrence
and social retribution. The motive for retribution ‘reﬂect[s] deeply held beliefs about
justice and the need to reafﬁrm those beliefs. Punishment based on retribution is driven by a
desire to see individuals pay for what they have done and to pay their debt to society’ (ibid.,
p. 679). The motive for deterrence is concerned ‘with deterring future threats rather than
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making criminals atone for past atrocities’ (ibid.). The wish for deterrence is associated
with forward-looking, in that the offender is kept from future wrong-doings, for instance by
discouraging transgressors from committing further violent acts. Thewish for retribution is
associated with backward-looking and is concerned ‘with making sure norm violators pay
for what they have done’, for instance, ‘to impose punishments that inﬂict pain equal to (or
greater than) that suffered by the victim’ (ibid.). In previous studies we found evidence that
the wishes for justice retribution (Lodewijkx, DeKwaadsteniet, & Nijstad, 2005;
Lodewijkx, DeKwaadsteniet, & van Zomeren et al., 2005) and deterrence (Lodewijkx
& van Zomeren, submitted) were involved, when people were exposed to victims of
‘senseless’ violence. Accordingly, these ﬁndings suggest that—besides just-world
beliefs—offender-related punitive responses may also be related to people’s participation
intentions.
Person and position identiﬁcation
One important, positive reason why people may choose to participate in silent marches
against violence may be their identiﬁcation with the victim. In their work on just-world
theory, Lerner, Miller, and Holmes (1976) differentiated between person and position
identiﬁcation. The ﬁrst refers to a unit relation between the observer and the victim. It
involves an empathic identiﬁcation with the victim, implying that one vicariously ‘feels’
the suffering of a victim. Position identiﬁcation relates to a non-unit relation with the
victim. It concerns a perceived (potential or future) fate similarity with the victim, that is, a
transpersonal, objective understanding of the position a victim ﬁnds him/herself in (‘That
could be me’). The differences between the two types of identiﬁcations are: (a) that
empathic person identiﬁcation involves a vicarious emotional reaction to the victim,
whereas position identiﬁcation does not; and (b) that the former is other-directed and the
latter is self-directed.
Van Zomeren and Lodewijkx (2005) argued that the two different kinds of identiﬁcation
may present two different, underlying pathways to protest against violent incidents. In their
experimental study they observed that participants’ degree of position identiﬁcation
signiﬁcantly mediated their personal initiatives to take action against such incidents (‘I
would like to prevent something like this from happening again’.), and also their wishes to
support the victims and/or their relatives. (‘I will attend the funeral’.) These initiatives and
support intentions were more strongly fuelled by anger than by pity. Person identiﬁcation,
on the other hand, only mediated participants’ intentions to support the victims, and these
intentions were mainly fuelled by pity. We assume that these two different identiﬁcation
pathways to take action against violent incidents will also be present in the current study.
Distress and afﬁliation
In view of the frequency with which silent marches occur in The Netherlands and
elsewhere in Europe, the assumption seems valid that violent incidents pose a threat to
Dutch residents, leading to distress and discontent. Indeed, Wittebrood (2006) found
evidence for this contention in The Netherlands. Therefore, we included the distress
variable in our study. We expect that stronger distress reactions will be associated with
stronger participation intentions.
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The literature further indicates that distress, due to (perceived or real) threat, may induce
an afﬁliate need among people. Schachter (1959) has shown that self-evaluative, social
comparison processes underlie the need for afﬁliation. When facing threat or danger,
people often do not know how to react or how to label their emotions, and therefore they
turn towards others to reduce their emotional uncertainty. Additional research has shown
that searches for cognitive and normative clarity are other important motives underlying
the need to afﬁliate (e.g. Lodewijkx, van Zomeren, & Syroit, 2005). Applying this
reasoning to violent incidents, we propose that the (perceived or real) threat, with
concomitant distress reactions evoked by such incidents, may induce an afﬁliate need
among Dutch residents, which will motivate them to seek others for reassurance through
emotional, cognitive and normative clarity. Therefore, we propose that afﬁliate tendencies
will also be positively related to the participation variable. This reasoning further implies
that a positive relationship can be expected between distress and afﬁliation—the more
distressed people are, the stronger their afﬁliate need will be triggered.
Research questions
The SVPM and moral mandate theory predict that—when perceiving moral threat—
moral-punitive beliefs will be an important underlying dimension in people’s participation
intentions. Just-world beliefs and punitive reactions directed at offenders present means to
restore justice in cases of violence, and engaging in silent marches may constitute ways to
reach this aim. Distress and afﬁliate reactions will also be positively related to the
participation intention variable. Finally, research by van Zomeren and Lodewijkx (2005)
indicated the existence of two underlying pathways to protest, that either involve people’s
self-directed, position identiﬁcation with the victim, or their other-directed, empathic
person identiﬁcation with the victim.We expect that such dual pathways to protest will also
be present in people’s willingness to take part in silent demonstrations.
METHOD
Design, procedure and participants
We conducted a survey among the residents of Heerlen (The Netherlands). We drew a
sample (N¼ 120) from these residents and they were administered a questionnaire which
was introduced as investigating the social climate and issues of crime and violence in The
Netherlands. The questionnaire was randomly distributed in three neighbourhoods of the
city, one lower-class, one middle-class and one upper-class (approximately N¼ 40, each).
One female experimenter personally distributed the questionnaires and also personally
collected them. When collecting the questionnaires, she requested participants whether
they knew any persons in the neighbourhood, who would also be willing to ﬁll out the
questionnaire. If the answer was afﬁrmative, she then personally solicited the questionnaire
to these persons and personally collected it. In this way, we succeeded to recruit 120
individuals, who all volunteered to take part in the study. This number sufﬁces to perform
principal component and path analyses, with which we will examine our research
questions. After completion, participants were personally debriefed and informed about
the background and purpose of the study. They received no fee or gift in return for their
participation.
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Descriptive statistics indicate that we succeeded to draw a heterogeneous sample with
sufﬁcient variation on the socio-demographic variables. The sample consisted of 56 males
(46.7%) and 64 females (53.3%), who for the largest part performed paid labour (85;
70.8%), with mean age of 34 years (range 16–76 years). Eighty two (68.3%) of the
participants indicated that they were cohabitated or married, 29 (24.2%) were not married,
while 9 (7.5%) were divorced. Seventy of the participants (58.3%) reported to have enjoyed
higher education (high school and beyond). Sixty nine (57.5%) participants indicated to
have no religious afﬁliation, 39 (32.2%) reported to be Catholics or Protestants and 12
(10.3%) reported other religious afﬁliations. Forty eight of the participants (40%) preferred
the left-wing social-democratic parties (SP, PVDA, Groen Links); 32 (26.6%) preferred the
liberal-democratic parties (VVD en D66) and 11 (9.2%) preferred the Christian-
democratic party (CDA). Twenty nine (24.2%) participants reported no political
preference.
Instruments
The theoretical variables were all operationalized using a 7-point Likert-type response
format (1¼ ‘strongly disagree’; 7¼ ‘strongly agree’), unless indicated otherwise. Table 1
presents inter-correlations between the theoretical variables, means and SDs, and the
reliability coefﬁcients (on the diagonal). Cronbach’s alpha coefﬁcients indicate that all
the variables are internally consistent. Various statistics, presented in Table 1, will be
discussed in this and later sections. For all the variables, items were recoded (where
required) and aggregated into composite measures. On all these measures higher ratings
indicate stronger agreement.
Willingness to participate. This variable was measured by four items, for example ‘If
people were to organize a silent march in my region, I would certainly participate’.
Belief in a just world. Participants checked a translated version of the BJW-self scale
(eight items) of Lipkus, Dalbert, and Siegler (1996). Items included for example: ‘I feel. . .
that I get what I am entitled to in life; that I get what I deserve; that I earn the rewards and
punishments I get’.
Punitiveness. We partially derived these operationalizations from Rucker et al. (2004).
Regarding deterrence, items included, for instance, the extent to which participants wished
that ‘offenders are discouraged from ever doing anything like this again’ and the wish ‘to
prevent future occurrences of this crime’. To assess justice retribution, participants rated
the extent to which ‘offenders should be punished’ (1¼ ‘very strongly’, 7¼ ‘very mildly’)
and to which ‘offenders deserved a long sentence’ (1¼ ‘strongly agree’, 7¼ ‘strongly
disagree’); adopted from Lodewijkx, DeKwaadsteniet, and van Zomeren et al. (2005,
Study 1). We added one item, derived from Rucker et al., and participants rated ‘to make
sure that the offenders should pay their debt to society’ (1¼ ‘strongly agree’, 7¼ ‘strongly
disagree’). Table 1 shows that the correlation between the two punitive reactions is r¼ 0.69
(p 0.001).
Moral responses. Moral outrage was measured by four items, derived from Tetlock
et al. (2000, Experiments 1 and 2): ‘Suppose that an offender of a violent incident was
caught and put to trial, but released due to procedural details. I would ﬁnd
that. . .disgusting, immoral, unjust’; and ‘This would make me very angry’. Moral
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cleansing was measured by three items, also partly derived from the Tetlock et al. studies.
They followed the format and items by which we operationalized moral outrage. An
example is: ‘I would invest a lot of time and effort to improve the administration of justice
in such cases; If one of the attorneys in that trial was a friend of mine, I would immediately
break up the friendship’. Item-analyses revealed that one item did not contribute
sufﬁciently to this scale (rir¼ 0.23,) and was therefore discarded. (‘This type of
administration of justice should be abolished’.) This resulted in two items to construct the
moral cleansing scale, with moderate reliability (a¼ 0.59). The two moral responses
correlate positively (r¼ 0.29, p 0.05), sharing 8.4% of common variance.
Identiﬁcation. Participants rated ﬁve items, derived from the Lodewijkx, DeKwaad-
steniet, and Nijstad (2005) and Lodewijkx, DeKwaadsteniet, and van Zomeren et al. (2005)
studies. We assessed person identiﬁcation by three items. One item tapped participants’
degree of global identiﬁcation with the victim: ‘Towhat extent do you identify with victims
of violent incidents’. The other two items measured participants’ degree of empathy:
‘When facing violent incidents . . .I personally empathize with the victims’; and. . .‘I feel
involved with the suffering of the victims’. We assessed position identiﬁcation with two
items: ‘When facing violent incidents, I feel. . .that this comes very close’; and. . .‘that this
can also happen to me or my relatives’. The two identiﬁcation scales correlate positively
(r¼ 0.38, p 0.01), with a common variance between the variables of 14.4%.
Personal distress. We measured this variable with three items, taken from the
‘Interpersonal Reactions Questionnaire’ (Batson et al., 1997): ‘If I think about my own
safeness in the Netherlands, this makes me feel. . . alarmed; upset; distressed’.
Afﬁliativeness. Participants ticked a translated version of the sociability/afﬁliativeness
measure, developed by Rothbart, Ahadi, and Evans (2000) in their Adult Temperament
Questionnaire (ATQ). The scale consists of 27 items with 7-point rating scales (1¼ ‘not
true’, 7¼ ‘very true’). Three subscales are distinguished: emotional empathy, described as
the degree of affective response congruent with others; empathic guilt, deﬁned as the
propensity to experience distress in response to negatively affecting others and social
closeness, described as the propensity to have feelings of warmth, closeness or involvement
with others. An example of an item measuring emotional empathy (10 items): ‘When I
would see someone lying sleeping in the streets, this would upset me’; for empathic guilt
(7 items): ‘I would feel guilty if I thought I had hurt someone’ and for social closeness
(10 items): ‘There are a number of people whom I care about a lot’. The three subscales
correlate positively (0.62 rs 0.44, ps 0.01). Observe that afﬁliativeness here is
conceptualized as a state rather than a trait variable.
Further, note that the mean ratings of several dependent variables in Table 1 are quite
extreme (i.e. justice retribution, deterrence, moral outrage, empathic guilt and social
closeness), indicating the relevance of these variables for our participants when being
exposed to the issue of crime and violence. Finally, regarding the expected positive
relationships between the afﬁliativeness scales and the distress measure, they were all not
signiﬁcant (rs 0.13).
Data reduction and analyses
We performed PCA to examine the inter-relationships between the scales, presented above,
and to reduce the data. We next tested our research questions by performing path analyses,
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using AMOS 5.0, in which we examined the inter-relationships between the participation
intention variable and the factors, extracted by the PCA.
RESULTS
PCA
Based on the inter-correlations between the scales, presented in Table 1, we can expect that
the underlying factors will correlate which each other. Therefore we conducted PCA, using
direct-oblimin rotation. The analyses extracted three factors with initial eigen values> 1
(see Table 2, for the extracted pattern matrix). According to the guidelines put forward by
Field (2005), the determinant of the correlation matrix that served as input for the PCA,
amounted to 0.015. This value exceeds the 0.00001-benchmark, indicating that there is no
sign of multicollinearity amongst the variables. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure
of sampling adequacy reached a ‘good’ value of 0.791, indicating that our sample size
(N¼ 120) is appropriate for conducting PCA. Additionally, the separate KMO-indices for
individual variables varied between 0.70<KMO< 0.87, all revealing good and sufﬁcient
sampling adequacy. The same conclusion holds when we look at Bartlett’s test of
sphericity, which appeared to be strongly signiﬁcant x2¼ 458.70 (df¼ 55), p< 0.001. All
these ﬁndings show that our sample size is sufﬁciently large to perform PCA and that the
data-quality is also sufﬁcient to perform such an analysis, allowing the extraction of
relatively stable factors.
Returning to the extracted factors, on the ﬁrst factor the punitive scales (deterrence and
justice retribution) and the moral outrage scale show high and signiﬁcant loadings.
Intriguingly, the empathic person identiﬁcation scale also loads signiﬁcantly on this factor.
This factor can thus be labelled an other-directed, moral outrage/punitive factor. The
second factor shows relationships between the scales that measure the afﬁliate tendency,
which appear to be positively related to just-world beliefs. Hence, we labelled this factor
afﬁliate just-world beliefs. Finally, we labelled the third factor a self-directed, moral
cleansing factor, which includes the scales measuring position identiﬁcation, moral
cleansing and distress.
These ﬁndings yield some intriguing results. Firstly, the other-directed moral outrage/
punitive factor appears to represent ‘empathic anger’, a concept distinguished by Hoffman
(1987; see also Vitaglione & Barnett, 2003; and the Discussion section). Secondly, the
ﬁndings show evidence for the ‘dual identiﬁcation pathways to protest’ model, as proposed
by van Zomeren and Lodewijkx (2005). That is, two of the three factors appear to revolve
around the different roles of person and position identiﬁcation in relation to the more angry
moral outrage response and the more fearful moral cleansing response, respectively.
Path analyses
Next, we examined the inter-relationships of these factors with the participation intention
variable. In preliminary analyses we included the demographic variables as control
variables. These analyses produced only one marginally signiﬁcant, negative relationship
between marital status and the dependent variable (b¼0.19, p¼ 0.07). Married and/or
cohabitated participants tend to engage in silent marches somewhat more than single
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participants. On the basis of these preliminary ﬁndings, we did not include the
demographic variables as control variables in follow-up analyses.
The ﬁndings of these latter analyses are summarized in the model, depicted in Figure 1.
In this model only the other-directed moral outrage/punitive and the afﬁliate just-world
factor showed a common residual error variance (b¼ 0.65, p< 0.001), and none of the
other variables. The recursive model revealed a satisfactory ﬁt to the data. Adequate ﬁt is
Table 2. Summarized results of PCA
Variable
Factor 1:
other-directed,
moral outrage/
punitive factor
Factor 2:
afﬁliate,
just-world beliefs
Factor 3:
self-directed,
moral cleansing factor
Deterrence 90 — —
Justice retribution 85 — —
Moral outrage 61 — —
Person identiﬁcation 60 — —
Social closeness — 78 —
Just-world beliefs — S77 —
Empathic guilt — 71 —
Empathy — 65 —
Distress — — 82
Moral cleansing — — 74
Position identiﬁcation — — 64
Initial eigen values 4.29 1.66 1.05
Variance after rotation (%) 39.04 19.10 9.53
Eigen values after rotation 3.40 2.93 2.48
Notes: Decimal points and loadings< 40 omitted. Direct-oblimin rotation method was used. The pattern matrix is
presented.
All loadings p 0.05.
Empathic, 
moral outrage / 
punitive factor
Self-directed 
moral cleansing 
factor
Affiliate 
just-world 
beliefs
Willingness 
to participate 
.26 **
.39 ***
.22 ** 
-.51 ***
.53 *** 
.31 *** (.08) 
e1
e2
.65***
Figure 1. Results of path analyses. Note: Standardized regression weights. Broken arrows indicate
mediated relationships; e1 and e2 indicate residual error variances. p 0.01; p 0.001.
Copyright # 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. J. Community Appl. Soc. Psychol., 18: 153–167 (2008)
DOI: 10.1002/casp
162 H. F. M. Lodewijkx et al.
indicated when the x2/df ratio is below 2. As to the current model, the value of x2 was 0.72
with df¼ 1, indicating that the ratio fell below the 2-benchmark (i.e. 0.72). Both central and
residual ﬁt indices substantiate the evaluation of the model ﬁt as satisfactory by,
respectively, achieving a desired value CFI> 0.90 (CFI¼ 1.00), and by achieving a desired
RMSEA value< 0.08 (RMSEA¼ 0.00). Of course, when looking at Figure 1, the model
appears nearly fully saturated (i.e. nearly all the possible paths between the variables are
drawn). This could be the reason why the model shows satisfactory ﬁt to the data. However,
such models do not imply that—therefore—all the relationships are signiﬁcant and that
the direction of these relationships would make sense theoretically. Moreover, as will be
shown below, when reversing the direction of some of the relationships in the model—
holding all the other relationships constant—this will strongly reduce the statistical ﬁt of
the model.
Direct effects. As expected in our research questions, Figure 1 shows that all the three
factors signiﬁcantly and positively relate to the participation intention variable (R2¼ 0.469,
p< 0.001). This is true for the self-directed moral cleansing factor (b¼ 0.39, p< 0.001),
which, relatively speaking, explains most of the variation in the dependent variable
(R2¼ 0.355). In a similar vein, the other-directed moral outrage/punitive factor (b¼ 0.26,
p< 0.01) and the afﬁliate just-world factor (b¼ 0.22, p< 0.01), also show positive
relationships with the dependent variable.
Indirect effects. Figure 1 further reveals some other conspicuous ﬁndings, which all
relate to the relevance of the other-directed moral outrage/punitive factor in our
participants’ responses. The analysis not only yielded a direct positive relationship of this
variable with the willingness to participate variable, but also two indirect relationships—
either through afﬁliate just-world beliefs (b¼0.51, p< 0.001), or through self-directed
moral cleansing responses (b¼ 0.53, p< 0.001).
As to the ﬁrst indirect pathway, the negative regression weight obtained here, indicates
that stronger other-directed moral outrage/punitive responses are associated with lowered
beliefs that the world is a just place and with lowered afﬁliativeness. In turn, however,
stronger afﬁliate just-world beliefs are positively related to people’s participation
intentions. When reversing this single path in the model—from afﬁliate just-world beliefs
to the moral outrage/punitive factor, holding all the other relationships constant—this
strongly reduced the statistical ﬁt of the model (x2/df ratio¼ 7.89, CFI¼ 0.896,
RMSEA¼ 0.243).
Regarding the second indirect pathway, the other-directed moral outrage/punitive
reactions are positively related to the self-directed moral cleansing reactions (b¼ 0.53,
p< 0.001), and not the other way around. When reversing this path in the model, this also
strongly reduced the ﬁt of the model (x2/df ratio¼ 23.41, CFI¼ 0.832, RMSEA¼ 0.438).
Noteworthy, the relationship between afﬁliate just-world beliefs and the self-directed
moral cleansing response was signiﬁcant in previously tested models, b¼ 0.31, p< 0.001.
However, this relationship was partialled out when adding the path between the moral
outrage/punitive factor and the self-directed moral cleansing factor in the model, resulting
in a non-signiﬁcant regression weight for the former relationship (b¼ 0.08, p< 0.40). This
mediation effect is signiﬁcant (t¼ 3.75, p< 0.01 by Sobel-test). This means that the
variation in the self-directed moral cleansing response, accounted for by afﬁliate just-world
beliefs, can be attributed to the other-directed moral outrage/punitive response. The ﬁnding
again elucidates the centrality of the latter variable in our participants’ reactions to crime
and violence, including their participation intentions.
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DISCUSSION
Willingness to participate
The silent marches against violent incidents that were held in The Netherlands and—more
recently—in Belgium, often involved offenders, who, for no apparent reason, murdered
innocent victims. As proposed by the SVPM, some of these incidents, can indeed, be
conceived as examples in which there were trade-offs between sacred and secular values,
such as killing someone for an mp3-player as recently happened in Brussels. More often,
however, there is a lack of any apparent, ulterior, secular motives on the part of the
offenders. To name but a few examples: In The Netherlands innocent victims were killed
because they made some remarks about the offender’s irresponsible driving behaviour
(Rene Steegman in Venlo); about the offender’s anti-social behaviour (Meindert Tjoelker
in Leeuwarden) or because they inadvertently stood in the offender’s way (Marianne Roza
and Froukje Schuitmaker in Gorinchem).
Consistent with Baumeister, Bushman, and Campbell (2000) we propose that the
frustration of narcissistic tendencies—that is, self-esteem that is based upon the conviction
that one is superior to others—is an important determinant of the impulsive-aggressive
outbursts of the (often relatively young) perpetrators in cases of ‘senseless’ violence. We
argue that the trade-offs in such cases consist of transgressions of sacred values for
egotistic, narcissistic motives. As predicted by the SVPM and moral mandate theory, our
general ﬁndings suggest that people’s reactions to such perceived ‘senseless’
transgressions are to resort to moralist-punitive beliefs to cognitively cope with such
situations. These beliefs may eventually propel people to take part in protests against such
incidents.
Relating to these participation intentions, our ﬁndings further revealed the existence of
three underlying factors that are signiﬁcantly related to this variable: an other-directed
moral outrage/punitive factor; a self-directed moral cleansing factor and an afﬁliate
just-world factor. As expected, all the three factors are positively associated with people’s
participation intentions. Admittedly, these ﬁndings only involve participants’ intentions to
engage in silent demonstrations, not to the fact that they actually would take part. This
constitutes a shortcoming of the present study. Thus, one should be very cautious to
generalize from these intentions to actual behaviour. However, it is comforting to know that
research has also shown that intentions to protest do predict actual protest behaviour (e.g.
De Weerd & Klandermans, 1999). Despite this shortcoming, our ﬁndings further showed
an intriguing pattern of relationships which may substantiate the processes put forward in
the SVPM and moral mandate theory. This pattern refers to the role of differential
identiﬁcation processes with the victim and their inter-relationships with moral outrage and
moral cleansing responses.
Identiﬁcation: dual pathways to protest?
As proposed by van Zomeren and Lodewijkx (2005), our ﬁndings can perhaps best be
represented by two underlying dimensions that constitute dual pathways to protest: an
other-directed and a self-directed dimension. Intriguingly, the other-directed pathway
reveals an association between victim-related empathic concerns, outrage and
offender-related punitive reactions. Perhaps our measure of empathic person identiﬁcation
does not tap the assumed vicarious emotional reaction to the victim, as we deﬁned this
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concept on the basis of Lerner et al.’s (1976) analysis. Perhaps this measure is more
indicative of what Staub (1987) labelled ‘reactive empathy’. With this reaction, one more
strongly acts in response to the predicament of the victim and not so much to his or her
emotional state. Related to this, Hoffman (1987) developed the term ‘empathic anger’. If a
person attributes the cause of a victim’s suffering to another person (such as, for instance,
an offender in a violent incident), then that person may experience anger at the offender on
behalf of the victim. In this sense empathic anger can perhaps best be conceived as
‘vicarious’ anger. Vitaglione and Barnett (2003) have shown that such angry empathic
reactions increase the likelihood that individuals will engage in helping as well as
punishing behaviours. Accordingly, the relationships we found between the variables that
present the other-directed moral outrage/punitive factor are consistent with this research.
Therefore, it is plausible to assume that this factor measures empathic anger. As our
ﬁndings further revealed this factor appears to be central in people’s reactions to issues of
crime and violence. This variable not only constitutes a direct pathway for people to
engage in protest against violent incidents, but is also involved in two indirect pathways.
That is, empathic anger indirectly inﬂuences people’s participation intentions, either
through afﬁliate just-world beliefs, or through self-directed moral cleansing reactions.
Regarding the latter reactions, our ﬁndings showed that the empathic anger response is
positively associated with the self-directed moral cleansing response, and not the other way
around. This means that empathic anger also instigates people to take part in protest,
presumably in an effort to (re-)afﬁrm the community-shared moral standards through
moral cleansing. Note that personal distress—and not outrage—is associated with this
value afﬁrmation factor. On these grounds it can be argued that, in ﬁrst instance, the
self-directed moral cleansing pathway is fuelled more strongly by moral anger. In second
instance, however, it is fuelled by fear. The same factor is also associated with the idea that
one could just as likely have been in the victim’s position (‘That could be me’). In other
words, if the self becomes implicated in violent events, or if issues of violence become
self-relevant, value afﬁrming moral cleansing responses might become relatively more
important than moral outrage/punitive responses. As our ﬁndings show such self-serving,
distress responses may also urge people to take overt action against violent incidents,
perhaps not for the beneﬁt of others, but more for themselves.
Just-world beliefs
The second indirect pathway involves the relationship between empathic anger and afﬁliate
just-world beliefs. This relationship is negative, suggesting that stronger empathic angry
reactions are associated with beliefs that the world is not a just place, and also with lowered
feelings of afﬁliativeness. In turn, stronger afﬁliate just-world beliefs are related to stronger
intentions to participate in silent marches. Presumably, one reason for people to engage in
such marches might thus be the preservation and/or re-establishment of the belief in a just
world.
We further note that we found no relationships between the distress measure on one hand
and just-world beliefs and the three afﬁliativeness scales on the other hand. To the best of
our knowledge, the positive relationship between just-world beliefs and afﬁliate tendencies
has never been reported (see for instance Furnham, 2003, for a recent review). One possible
explanation for our ﬁndings is presented by Otto et al. (2006), who concluded that personal
just-world beliefs may serve as a buffer against the negative consequences of an unjust fate
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(people suffering from ﬂoods in their region) and that these beliefs may have a reassuring
function. This very same buffering mechanism might explain the pattern of relationships
we have observed here. When endorsing the just-world belief system, the feelings of
connectedness with others may perhaps help people to defensively preserve the delusion
that the world is a just place, lowering personal distress. Admittedly, however, our study
does not allow us to draw any ‘causal’ relationships between these variables, that is,
whether just-world beliefs activate afﬁliate tendencies, or vice versa; or whether the
just-world preservation tendency leads to lowered distress levels and stronger participation
intentions in cases where people are exposed to violent incidents. Future research should
address all these (causal) relationships in more detail.
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